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Utah Court of Appeals 
4 00 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. Basford 
Case No. 890281-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and the order issued orally by the court during oral 
argument on August 28, 1990, Appellant, Ronald Basford, submits 
this letter of supplemental authorities. 
This letter of supplemental authorities is relevant to 
the issue raised in Point IA of Appellant's Opening Brief at 
5-11, the State's "confession" of error contained in Appellee's 
Brief at 3-6, and the question raised by this Court during oral 
argument as to the impact of dictum in a Utah Supreme Court 
decision. 
In State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court analyzed the two-part test set forth in 
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). In regard to the first 
prong of that test, the Court stated: 
Possessing a stolen vehicle also contains two 
elements: (1) possessing a vehicle, and 
(2) knowing or having reason to believe it was 
stolen. 
Id. at 18. 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
August 31, 1990 
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The application of the first prong or principal test in 
Hill was not necessary to the court's decision in Larocco. The 
Larocco decision hinges on the application of the second prong in 
Hill, and the impact of the passage of time. The language at 
issue is therefore dictum. 
The extent to which dictum from the Utah Supreme Court 
controls this Court's decisions is not clear. There are no 
statutory or procedural guidelines and Appellant was unable to 
locate any Utah cases discussing the issue. 
Cases from other jurisdictions indicate, however, that 
although a lower court can consider and be guided by dictum, 
dictum is not "authority" which controls a decision. See York 
Typo Union No. 242 v. Maple Press Co., 442 F. Supp. 511, 517 
(Penn. 1977) (case containing dictum is not authority). 
In Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr. 
513, 518 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1989), the court pointed out that it 
is "axiomatic" that only the "ratio decidendi" of the California 
Supreme Court is "fully binding on the lower courts of [that] 
state. (citations omitted.)" Although dicta is not binding, it 
is persuasive and "commands serious respect." The Court stated: 
A statement which does not possess the force 
of a square holding may nevertheless be 
considered highly persuasive, particularly 
when made by an able court after careful 
consideration or in the course of an elaborate 
review of the authorities . . . . 
Id. at 518. See also Minelian v. Manzellar 263 Cal. Rptr. 597 
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989) (lower courts considered language of 
case dicta and therefore not binding). 
In Daniel v. Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1404 (11th Cir. 
1986), the Court noted that dictum from that same circuit (as 
well as dictum from the Fourth Circuit) was not "binding 
precedent." 
The following cases also support a determination that 
dictum from the Utah Supreme Court is not binding on this Court. 
W.F. Browning, III et al v. Europa Hair, Inc., 243 S.E.2d 743 
(Ga. App. 1978) (statement made by Court of Appeals on motion for 
rehearing was "obiter dictum" and not binding on trial court to 
which case was remitted); Gertz v. Welch, 680 F.2d 527, 533 (7th 
Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is critical to determine what issues were 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
August 31, 1990 
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actually decided in order to define what is the 'law' of the 
case • . . [Observations, commentary or mere dicta touching upon 
issues not formally before the court do not constitute binding 
determinations.11); People v. Schwimmer, 417 N.Y.S.2d 655, 659 
(1979) (statements were dicta and not binding). 
Black's Law Dictionary points out that " [statements and 
comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal 
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to the 
determination of the case in hand are obiter dictum, and lack the 
force of adjudication." (emphasis added) Black's Law 
Dictionary, 4th ed. (1968) 541. 
The dictum in Larocco which suggests that there are only 
two elements in Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 is not binding 
authority on this Court. Although this Court should review and 
consider dictum in Supreme Court decisions, it should also focus 
on the background and circumstances giving rise to the statement 
at issue in deciding whether the language is controlling. 
In Larocco, the facts indicated that the defendant had 
the intent to procure or pass title since he did in fact obtain 
title to the vehicle in his name. An intent to procure or pass 
title to a vehicle in one's possession necessarily includes a 
purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle. The analysis as to 
the principal test of State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), as 
applied in Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, does not hinge on 
the intent requirement and would have been the same regardless of 
whether the court included intent to procure or pass title as an 
element under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112. 
Furthermore, in making the statement, the court did not 
engage in an "elaborate review of authorities" or make a careful 
consideration of the issue which is now squarely presented to 
this Court as to whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 requires an 
intent to procure or pass title under all circumstances. 
JCW:kll 
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DELIVERED original and seven copies of the foregoing 
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East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and a copy of the foregoing to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this day of August, 1990. 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED 
AUG 3D 1990 
Wftifci Cawiift m Achats 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CAROLE D. MARTINDALE, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND 
ORDER TO STRIKE BRIEF DUE DATE 
UNTIL AFTER ALL TRANSCRIPTS 
ARE PREPARED 
Case No. 900353-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Pursuant to Rules 22(b) and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, JOAN C. WATT, attorney for Appellant, hereby moves this 
Court to rescind the previously set due date of September 14, 1990 
and reset the due date for Appellant's brief up to and including 
forty days from receipt of the complete transcript. 
Defense counsel initially requested transcripts of both 
circuit court and district court hearings. Transcripts of the 
district court hearings have been prepared; however, the transcripts 
of circuit court hearings have not been filed. All transcripts are 
required to prepare the brief. 
The brief is currently due September 14, 1990. 
DATED this <3J&£ day of August, 1990. 
CodBw 
)AN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STIPULATION 
I, SANDRA L. SJOGREN, Assistant Attorney General, do hereby 
stipulate to the extension requested herein. 
DATED this ^'-^ day of August, 1990. 
^SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an extension of time be given to 
Appellant for the preparation of Appellant's brief up to and 
including forty days from receipt of the complete transcript. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 3V 
day of August, 1990. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD W. BASFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No, 890281-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant, Ronald Basford, refers this Court to 
his opening brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the case, and 
the facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In addition to the issues outlined in Appellant's opening 
brief at 1-2, the State's brief raises the following issue: 
What is the appropriate remedy where there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112? 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under either the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-112 urged by the State or that urged by Mr. Basford, 
Appellants conviction under that section should be reversed. The 
State concedes this point in its brief, agreeing that conviction 
under that code section was inappropriate. 
The appropriate relief under the circumstances of this case 
is acquittal. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Basford on the charge, 
and this Court cannot look behind that acquittal even if it appears 
erroneous. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees that 
acquittal is the appropriate relief, it nevertheless is precluded 
from entering a conviction for anything greater than Joyriding, a 
class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) explicitly 
requires that a defendant have sought the relief for an alternative 
conviction to be entered after a finding of insufficient evidence; 




THE CONVICTION UNDER § 41-1-112 MUST BE REVERSED; 
THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF AFTER REVERSAL IS ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR, ALTERNATIVELY, AT THE 
MOST, CONVICTION FOR A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR JOYRIDING. 
The State concedes that there was insufficient evidence in 
this case to support a conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 
(1953 as amended) (State/s Brief at 4, 6). Although the State 
reaches its conclusion based on a different analysis of the statute 
than that of Appellant, regardless of the analysis adopted by this 
Court, insufficient evidence exists and the conviction under 
§ 41-1-112 must be reversed. 
The State analyzes Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as 
amended) to require a "mens rea of intent to procure or pass title 
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to the vehicle," State's Brief at 5. While Appellant has no issue 
with this interpretation of the statute, and, in fact, would desire 
such an interpretation of the intent required under the statute, it 
should be noted that an intent to procure or pass title necessarily 
includes an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. 
In this case, since there is absolutely no evidence of either an 
intent to procure or pass title to the vehicle or to permanently 
deprive the owner thereof, the conviction under § 41-1-112 must be 
reversed. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Basford argued, first, that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under § 41-1-112 
and, alternatively ("Assuming, arguendo . . . " Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 12), that under the trial court's interpretation of 
§ 41-1-112, Joyriding was a lesser offense of § 41-1-112. Under the 
first scenario, Mr. Basford requested that his conviction be 
reversed. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11. Under the alternative 
scenario, assuming the trial judge interpreted § 41-1-112 correctly 
and Joyriding was a lesser included offense, Mr. Basford requested 
that a class A misdemeanor Joyriding conviction be entered. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 16. 
The State misreads Appellant's requested remedy when it 
states "[t]he State agrees with Appellant that this case should be 
remanded for entry of judgment of conviction for joyriding under 
§ 41-1-109." State's Brief at 6. Mr. Basford intended such a 
request only in the context of his argument contained in Point IB of 
his opening brief that the greater offense under § 41-1-112 should 
- 3 -
be set aside1 and only insofar as it related to the class A 
misdemeanor version of the statute. 
When a case is reversed for insufficient evidence, a 
judgment of acquittal rather than a new trial is the appropriate 
remedy. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (1953 as amended); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1953 as amended); McNair v. Havwood. 666 P.2d 
321, 324-5 (Utah 1983); Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
The rationale for an acquittal rather than a new trial is grounded 
in the protection against double jeopardy contained in the fifth 
amendment and applicable to the States through the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution; Article I, § 12 of the 
Utah Constitution; and the statutory provisions listed above. See 
generally Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-17. 
In cases where there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction, a judgment for conviction on a lesser included offense 
can be entered if (1) the defendant sought such a reduction and 
1
 Although Mr. Basford does not mean to suggest that he 
requested the remedy articulated by the State under all 
circumstances of this case, even if he had made such a request, the 
appropriate remedy would nevertheless be a judgment of acquittal. 
See McNair v. Havward. 666 P.2d 321, 324-5 (Utah 1983); Burks v. 
United States. 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In 
Burks, the United States Supreme Court held that acquittal was the 
appropriate remedy where a conviction was reversed for insufficient 
evidence, even though the defendant had made a motion for new trieil 
rather than acquittal. 
In addition, even if the defendant had requested an 
incorrect remedy, the State would be required to acknowledge the 
appropriate remedy based on its duty to promote justice. See 
State v. Bailev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 1989). As the 
United States Supreme Court stated in Burks, the only "just" remedy 
after reversal for insufficient evidence is acquittal. 
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(2) the trier of fact found every fact required for conviction of an 
"included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1953 as amended); 
see State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) 
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) provides: 
(5) If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal 
or certiorari, shall determine that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included 
offense and the trier of fact necessarily found 
every fact required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may 
be set aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought 
by the defendant. 
In the present case, the State did not charge Mr. Basford 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109. In the trial court, as part of his 
argument based on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), 
Mr. Basford argued that a conviction for a class A misdemeanor under 
§ 41-1-109 was appropriate. If this Court interprets § 41-1-112 as 
either the defendant or State has urged it to do, § 41-1-109 is not 
a lesser offense due to the distinct intent requirements. 
Therefore, conviction for either a misdemeanor or felony under 
§ 41-1-109 is not appropriate pursuant to the restrictions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) when read in conjunction with double 
jeopardy concerns. 
In addition, the trial judge explicitly found that the 
facts did not fit within § 41-1-109. R 11. He stated: 
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The Court finds that the acts of the defendant fall 
within Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated, That 
the elements of that crime differ from the elements 
of the crime in Section 41-1-109• That the facts 
stipulated to and the reasonable inferences thereof 
do no[t] bring this matter within 41-1-109. 
R 11. In State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983), the 
Court stated: "A ruling that constitutes a factual resolution in 
favor of the defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense 
charged is acquittal." Based on double jeopardy principles, the 
Musselman Court determined that the case could not be retried, 
reasoning that it "may not reassess an acquittal even though the 
acquittal was made under an incorrect application of the law or an 
improper determination of the facts." Id. at 1065. 
The trial judge's statement quoted above amounted to an 
acquittal under § 41-1-109, and this Court is not free to reassess 
that decision even if it appears erroneous. 
Finally, even if this Court disagrees that acquittal is the 
appropriate remedy, the only possible conviction that could be 
entered is for a class A misdemeanor.2 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) 
explicitly requires that a defendant have sought the relief in 
question for an alternative conviction to be entered after a finding 
2
 Mr. Basford continues to maintain that if this Court 
determines that acquittal is not appropriate and conviction for 
Joyriding should be entered, the Joyriding is, at best, a class A 
misdemeanor. The State's attempt to distinguish between an intent 
to abandon the truck near where it was taken and an actual return of 
the truck to the owner is meaningless in this case where Mr. Basord 
was arrested less than twenty-four hours after the vehicle was 
taken. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 15-16. 
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of insufficient evidence on the greater offense.3 In this case, the 
defendant at no time requested conviction under the felony Joyriding 
statute, and such a remedy is therefore not appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant, Ronald Basford, respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-112 and enter judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, enter 
a conviction for Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. 
SUBMITTED this 35 day of June, 1990. 
J/OJES C. BRADSHAW 
ttorney for Defendant/Appellant 
<3&Ca)citf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
3
 Appellant does not intend that this alternative argument 
be interpreted as a request for such relief. If this Court 
interprets § 41-1-112 as the State has urged it to do, Appellant 
believes the appropriate remedy is acquittal. However, in the event 
this Court disagrees, this argument is offered to establish that, at 
most, this Court can enter a conviction for class A misdemenaor 
Joyriding. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this *^ ST day of June, 1990. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
of June, 1990. 
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